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Summary: This paper summarizes empirical research undertaken by Federal Reserve 
Board (FRB) staff in support of the asset-correlation assumption implicit in the 
regulatory capital formula for mortgages on single-family residences (structures with up 
to four living units) in the proposed New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II). This analysis 
employs several alternative credit-risk models for residential mortgages. Among these is 
the FRB model, which is a multiperiod, multifactor simulation model designed to 
estimate economic capital for thirty-year, conforming, conventional, fixed-rate, prime 
mortgages. In addition, we explore the implications of models developed by various 
industry practitioners. We find that the 15 percent asset-correlation assumption implicit 
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*The revision, which is minor, is explained in table 1.     
 
I. Introduction 
Banks, thrift institutions, and bank holding companies in the United States must 
maintain a minimum leverage ratio and two minimum risk-based ratios.
1  The current 
U.S. risk-based capital requirements are based on the 1988 Basel Capital Accord, an 
international regulatory framework for capital measurement developed by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision. The Basel Committee has been working for several 
years to develop a new regulatory capital framework that recognizes developments in 
financial markets and risk management practices that have emerged since the 1988 
accord. On April 29, 2003, the Basel Committee released for public comment “The New 
Basel Capital Accord,” the third in a series of consultative papers.
2  
A particularly important and challenging aspect of the New Basel Capital Accord 
(Basel II) as it applies to the United States is the determination of minimum regulatory 
capital charges for single-family residential mortgages. First, mortgages on single-family 
residences (structures with up to four living units) constitute a significant share of the 
portfolios of the largest U.S. banking organizations.
3 Second, state-of-the-art practices 
available to evaluate mortgage credit risk employ highly sophisticated multifactor and 
multiperiod models using vast amounts of data. Codifying such models into relatively 
simple regulatory rules is quite challenging.  
  The focus of this paper is the Advanced Internal-Ratings-Based (A-IRB) 
approach proposed in Basel II for determining minimum regulatory capital charges for 
single-family residential mortgages. To assist the public in evaluating the Basel II 
proposal, we summarize empirical work undertaken by Federal Reserve Board staff that 
has helped shape the proposed Basel II capital function for single-family mortgages--in 
particular, its 15 percent asset-correlation assumption. We first summarize the A-IRB 
approach for determining capital charges for single-family residential mortgages and 
                                                 
1 The leverage ratio measures regulatory capital as a percentage of total on-balance-sheet assets as reported 
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) (with certain adjustments). The risk-
based ratios measure regulatory capital as a percentage of both on- and off-balance-sheet credit exposures 
with some gross differentiation based on perceived credit risk.  
2 The paper is available at www.bis.org/bcbs/bcbscp3.htm. 
3  At the end of 2003:Q1, the ten largest U.S. commercial banks held $500 billion, or 15.7 percent of their 
total assets, in such loans. In addition, according to Call Report data, we estimate that these banks held an 
additional $356 billion in securities backed by such loans (11.1 percent of total assets).     2 
 
illustrate its use for various types of mortgages. Next we review estimates of economic 
capital produced by several credit risk models for residential mortgages. Last, we 
translate these economic capital allocations into implied asset-correlation parameters; we 
find these parameters to be broadly consistent with the 15 percent correlation assumption 
embodied in the Basel II proposal.  
 
II.   Summary of the Basel A-IRB Rule for Single-Family Residential Mortgages 
  A broad purpose of the IRB approach is to improve the alignment between the 
minimum regulatory capital requirements for specific bank investments to the economic 
capital for the credit risk associated with these investments. Broadly speaking, economic, 
or “value-at-risk” capital quantifies the expected reduction in the value of an investment 
due to a severe economic event. A typical and more specific definition is that economic 
capital is coverage for unexpected losses, where unexpected losses are the amount of 
losses in a severe or “tail” event less expected losses. The specified tail percentile 
defining the A-IRB standard does not necessarily coincide with the standard used for 
internal economic capital calculations by any particular banking institution. Indeed, it is 
expected that the internal economic capital allocations of well-managed banks will be 
based upon a more stringent loss-coverage target than that which underlies the A-IRB 
rule. As such, economic capital charges will generally exceed regulatory capital 
requirements.  
The better alignment between regulatory and economic measures of capital is 
brought about by transforming credit-risk parameters specific to a particular investment 
into a regulatory capital charge. For an individual mortgage loan, these risk parameters 
are the exposure at default (EAD), probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), 
and asset correlation (ρ). In general, the EAD for a mortgage equals the outstanding loan 
balance. Both PD and LGD would be provided by the bank by “risk segment” subject to 
standards set forth in Basel II.
4 The Basel Committee has specified that ρ be set equal to 
0.15 (or 15 percent) for mortgages on single-family (one- to four-unit) residences. 
                                                 
4 Risk segment refers to a particular loan category distinguished by degree of risk and risk characteristics. 
For example, a portfolio may be divided into various segments distinguished by borrower credit history 
and the LTV ratio of the loan.     3 
 
Given values of the above parameters, the minimum total regulatory capital 













− − Φ + Φ
          ( 1 )  
where Φ is the standard normal distribution function; Φ
-1 is its inverse; and C is the 
confidence interval, which has been set by Basel II at 0.999. The risk weight for any asset 
is defined as the amount of regulatory capital expressed as a fraction of 8 percent.
5  
  Under Basel II, the internal systems, models, and processes of banks would 
generate the values of PD and LGD. The proposed standards in Basel II will permit 
flexibility in how PD estimates may be developed, although the intent is to measure PD 
as the annualized average probability of default over a mortgage's expected remaining 
life.  LGD would be measured as the expected loss severity in a period of high default 
rates for residential mortgages. That is, the LGD input is to represent something akin to a 
“recession LGD.”  
  The Basel II A-IRB proposal does not explicitly address the question of private 
mortgage insurance (PMI), a form of credit-risk mitigation for residential mortgages, nor 
more complex insurance arrangements such as captive reinsurance, which is used by 
some large banks. One possibility consistent with the proposed framework is to 
incorporate reimbursement from PMI claims into the LGD calculation. Alternatively, 
PMI could be treated as a “guarantee” and be assigned a risk weight applicable to the 
guarantor for the guaranteed portion of the loan.  Since the purpose of the present 
document is to review the research underlying the proposed Basel II risk-weight formula 
for single-family residential mortgages, attention is restricted to results pertaining to 
loans not covered by PMI. We note, however, that the recent Advance Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking solicits comments on the question of appropriate treatment of PMI 
and on related issues such as the counterparty risk embodied in such insurance. 
                                                 
5 That is, RW = 1250 x (k/EAD).    4 
 
Illustrative Calculations 
   Information quantifying PDs and recession LGDs by risk segment is not easily 
obtained because it is generally proprietary. We present three sets of illustrative 
calculations based upon information assembled from various nonproprietary sources:  
1.  PD estimates for newly originated loans are based on a credit risk model for 
residential mortgages developed by Federal Reserve Board staff (the “FRB 
model”), which is discussed in detail below. These estimates all pertain to 
prime, conventional, first-lien, fixed-rate, thirty-year mortgages.  
2.  PD estimates are derived from information published in a recent study of the 
market for jumbo prime and alt-A residential-mortgage-backed securities 
(RMBS).
 6  The study reports that cumulative loss rates for pools of jumbo 
prime and alt-A mortgages originated between 1993 and 1997 are equal to 
0.20 percent and 0.35 percent respectively.
7  From these data, we have 
constructed implied PD estimates by dividing the loss rate for each product 
by 5 (average life), and again by its estimated average loss given default.
8   
3.  PD estimates are based upon a highly stylized, hypothetical, and highly 
seasoned portfolio of prime loans that enjoyed the benefits of appreciation 
in the price of the properties securing the loans. We choose a low PD of 
0.19 percent, which is highly plausible for a portfolio with an average 
current loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 60 percent or so and FICO scores 
averaging well above 700. 
 
                                                 
6  See Laurent Gauthier, “Market-Implied Losses and Non-Agency Subordinated MBS," Journal of Fixed 
Income, vol. 13 (2003), no. 1, pp. 49–74. Jumbo prime refers to a loan for which the borrower’s credit 
score (or FICO score) indicates very low credit risk and the size of which is too large to qualify for 
purchase by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Alt-A refers to a loan for which the borrower’s credit score 
either is marginally below that for prime borrowers or is in the prime range but is accompanied by issues 
requiring special attention when underwriting (such as lack of income documentation or non-owner 
occupancy). Both jumbo prime and alt-A loan types constitute a sizable and growing segment of the RMBS 
market; $145 billion of the jumbo prime RMBS and $55 billion of the Alt-A products were issued in 2002. 
7 Only data pertaining to thirty-year mortgages are used. The pools mostly consist of fixed-rate loans that 
were newly originated when the pools were formed. 
8 The rates for average loss given default were selected, after discussions with Laurent Gauthier, to be 0.15 
for jumbo prime loans and 0.25 for alt-A loans.     5 
 
As noted above, use of the Basel II capital formula requires that a recession LGD 
be estimated for each risk segment (table 1). Most recession LGDs are estimated by 
simulating the loss severity function in the FRB model over historical periods of high 
mortgage default rates. These estimates apply to a loan that is not covered by private 
mortgage insurance (PMI). More details about the procedure for deriving these LGD 
estimates are provided in the appendix. The only exceptions to this approach pertain to 
the estimates of LGD for the jumbo prime loans, the alt-A loans, and the hypothetical 
seasoned portfolios. In the absence of a model for these data, the specific estimates 
represent plausible approximations to the LGDs appropriate for these three loan groups 
(table 1, column 2).  
In conformance with the goal of creating a more risk-sensitive regulatory capital 
framework, the Basel II capital charges and their associated risk weights vary widely 
among risk segments.  Recall that Basel I fixes the risk weight at a constant 50 percent 
for qualifying residential mortgages. The Basel II risk weights range from 3 percent (for a 
loan with a FICO score of 740 and LTV ratio of 70 percent) to 62 percent (for a loan with 
FICO of 620 and LTV ratio of 95 percent). The risk weights for prime jumbo and alt-A 
loans are in the middle of that range, at 13 percent and 19 percent respectively. The last 
line of table 1 applies the Basel II rule to the average statistics for a hypothetical portfolio 
of single-family, geographically diversified, seasoned, prime loans with low current LTV 
ratios and is provided to highlight the outcome of the Basel II rule for a highly seasoned 
portfolio of prime mortgages. The risk weight for this seasoned portfolio evaluated at 
mean values is 10 percent.
9 
These risk weights can be used to define the amount of additional regulatory 
capital required to put a qualifying residential mortgage of each type on the balance 
sheet. The amount of additional Tier 1 capital (common stock and preferred stock) 
required for such mortgages must exceed 4 percent of the risk-weighted mortgage assets. 
The amount of total capital, which is defined under both Basel I and Basel II as the sum 
of Tier 1 capital (common stock and preferred stock) and Tier 2 capital (subordinated 
                                                 
9 A more accurate estimate would evaluate capital at the loan level or for larger numbers of loan buckets. 
Also, note that this amount of capital pertains to a nationally diversified portfolio of high-quality, seasoned 
loans.    6 
 
debt and loss reserves), must exceed 8 percent of risk-weighted assets. Thus, for instance, 
the additional amount of regulatory Tier 1 capital for a mortgage is its risk weight times 4 
percent of the loan balance. For example, the marginal Tier 1 regulatory capital for a 
mortgage with a risk weight of 25 percent equals 100 basis points, that is, 0.25 *0.04 = 
0.01 = 100 basis points.  
This logic leads to the final column of table 1, which shows the additional amount 
of Tier 1 regulatory capital in basis points needed to finance an additional dollar of 
exposure in a single-family residential mortgage of each type. The required amount of 
total capital can be obtained simply by doubling the Tier 1 amount shown in the table. 
The Tier 1 estimates range from 12 basis points to 248 basis points for the newly 
originated loans. The pool of jumbo prime loans would require 53 basis points of Tier 1 
capital and the alt-A pool would require 77 basis points. The hypothetical seasoned prime 
pool would require Tier 1 capital of 40 basis points.  
 
III. Evidence Regarding Economic Capital for Residential Mortgages 
As noted above, the Basel II proposal sets capital charges for residential 
mortgages on the basis of four parameters: the bank-determined inputs PD, LGD, and 
EAD; and the supervisory-determined asset-correlation parameter.
10   
Because of its importance in Basel II and because state-of-the-art models of 
mortgage capital do not usually contain an explicit asset-correlation parameter, we offer 
an intuitive explanation of what the term does and does not represent. Literally 
interpreted, the rule assumes that year-to-year variation in default rates for a portfolio of 
residential mortgages (or the portfolio of all assets) is driven by changes in a single, 
underlying risk factor during the same time period. This commonality of response is 
captured by the asset-correlation parameter in a formal “regulatory” credit-risk model. A 
strict linkage between the asset-correlation parameter and one or more economic 
variables is not specified in Basel II.  Neither is it presumed that the one-factor model is a 
                                                 
10 A rigorous derivation and explanation of the asset-correlation parameter in the context of the Basel II 
rule is contained in Michael B. Gordy, “A Risk-Factor Model Foundation for Ratings Based Bank Capital 
Rules,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 12 (2003), pp. 199–233.    7 
 
complete characterization of the default risk embedded in a particular exposure. Rather, it 
is an approximation whose accuracy may vary among exposures and over time.  
In particular, the Basel II capital formula for residential mortgages is simpler than 
state-of-the-art models of mortgage portfolio credit risk.
11 These models view default and 
prepayment as competing risks that play out over a number of years. National and local 
market movements in house prices, interest rates, and a host of other borrower-specific 
and mortgage-specific characteristics, especially the borrower’s initial equity investment 
and credit score, have been shown to significantly influence mortgage default and 
prepayment probabilities.
12 
In order to assess what might be reasonable asset-correlation assumptions for use 
in the Basel II rule, Federal Reserve Board staff has employed several state-of-the-art 
credit-risk models for mortgages. Estimates of asset correlations were developed through 
a two-step process. First, economic capital allocations for single-family mortgages were 
generated using these models of mortgage credit risk calibrated with industry data. 
Second, an asset-correlation parameter was “reverse engineered” to match as closely as 
possible the capital charges implied by the Basel II formula with the economic capital 
allocations derived in the first step.  
Applying this two-step procedure raises a number of challenges. One, for 
instance, is calibrating sophisticated models of mortgage portfolio credit risk in the 
absence of loan-level mortgage performance databases directly available to Federal 
Reserve Board staff. Thus, indirect methods of calibration had to be used. Another 
challenge is to translate the economic capital results from various multiperiod, 
multifactor models into the asset-correlation parameter, ρ. Selection of the value for ρ 
poses an especially challenging assignment because no single value will ensure an exact 
match across the full, relevant range of PD and LGD inputs between the results of the 
Basel II rule and the economic capital allocations implied by various models.  
The remainder of this section focuses on evidence pertaining to economic capital 
for residential mortgages. The section is divided into two parts. The first part reviews the 
                                                 
11 This is also true for other asset categories in Basel II.     8 
 
FRB credit model for residential mortgages along with estimates of economic capital 
produced by this model. The second part summarizes estimates of economic capital 
implied by other modeling approaches. In section IV, we describe the reverse-
engineering of asset correlations from these estimates of economic capital.  
 
The FRB Credit Model  
 The FRB credit model for residential mortgages consists of three main 
components: (1) behavioral equations that determine prepayment and foreclosure 
probabilities for thirty-year, fixed-rate mortgages as functions of changes in house prices 
and interest rates; (2) a loss-given-foreclosure (LGF) equation; and (3) a simulation 
algorithm that calculates the probability distribution of cumulative discounted losses on 
the basis of simulated paths for interest rates and house prices for a specified period.
13 
The model generates a probability distribution of the present value of cumulative 
credit losses over a given multiyear period for specified risk segments within a large 
portfolio of newly originated and seasoned mortgage loans. It is assumed that no single 
loan accounts for more than a negligible proportion of the overall portfolio. Ex ante risk 
characteristics of a segment include a specified initial loan-to-value ratio and borrower 
FICO score, as well as a distribution of loan sizes. Economic capital--or credit value-at-
risk--for the risk segment equals the credit loss associated with a selected tail-percentile 
of the simulated credit loss distribution less the expected loss.  
The model’s behavioral equations were adapted from the Loan Performance Risk 
Model, developed by the Loan Performance Corporation (LP). The original behavioral 
equations in the LP model were estimated on the basis of a comprehensive database for 
residential mortgages that LP has compiled from the portfolios of the largest mortgage 
originators and investors in the country. The database includes 70 percent to 80 percent 
of outstanding single-family residential mortgage debt, according to LP representatives. 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 A recent example with a full set of references is Charles A. Calhoun and Yongheng Deng, “A Dynamic 
Analysis of Fixed- and Adjustable-Rate Mortgage Terminations,” Journal of Real Estate Finance and 
Economics, vol. 24 (2002), pp. 9–33.  
13 The following summary of the FRB credit model is largely drawn from Paul S. Calem and Michael 
LaCour-Little, “Risk-Based Capital Requirements for Mortgage Loans,” Journal of Banking and Finance 
(forthcoming). The article is available at www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/03784266. Those 
interested in receiving a copy may also contact the authors directly.    9 
 
The key determinants of default and prepayment in these equations are those used in 
most industry-standard models of this type. These include: (1) a measure of the incentive 
to refinance (coupon rate relative to current market rate); (2) the amount of equity 
available to the borrower (current LTV); (3) the age of the mortgage; (4) the borrower’s 
FICO score; and (5) miscellaneous borrower-specific and mortgage-specific 
characteristics, such as loan size.  
The data used to estimate these equations are proprietary and were not available 
to Federal Reserve Board staff. However, various summary statistics together with 
documentation of the steps taken by LP to prepare the data for estimation were provided 
to us on a confidential basis. We reviewed this information and conducted simulation 
exercises to assess the reasonableness of the behavioral equations provided by LP. 
Importantly, the data do not incorporate subprime mortgage pools or loans that are 
explicitly identified as subprime, although a wide range of borrower FICO scores are 
found in the data. 
The LP transition model was not used directly within the FRB model. Rather, the 
FRB model incorporates approximations to the LP equations. The most common 
approach taken in the literature to modeling mortgage prepayments and foreclosures 
focuses upon three types of transitions for a loan that is current (but could be delinquent): 
(1) continue as current; (2) prepay; and (3) proceed to a terminal default state, a stage that 
includes foreclosure completion, deed in lieu of foreclosure, and short sale, all of which 
we will henceforth refer to collectively as foreclosure completion.
14  In contrast, the LP 
model includes not only the three terminal default states, but also an intermediate default 
state--“foreclosure initiation”--as well as earlier stages of delinquency (sixty days past 
due, sixty to ninety days past due, etc.). That is, the LP framework incorporates a 
multidimensional “roll-rate” structure in which a loan in a particular stage of delinquency 
can return to an earlier stage (or to being current) or can proceed to a more severe 
delinquency state culminating with entry into a foreclosure or an alternative-to-
foreclosure process. To facilitate implementation of the FRB model and to mitigate 
                                                 
14 In a short sale, a lender agrees to the sale of collateral still owned by the borrower for less than the loan 
amount outstanding and to accept sale proceeds, sometimes accompanied by an unsecured note in the 
amount of any deficiency, in satisfaction of the debt.    10 
 
potential concerns regarding the effects of model complexity on the precision of the 
estimated parameters, we employed statistically and judgmentally based smoothing 
techniques to reduce the dimensionality of the state transition matrix when implementing 
the LP model’s behavioral equations.  
The final FRB model incorporates a hybrid specification that includes a single 
intermediate default state. The model posits five possible states for a mortgage: (1) 
current (but possibly delinquent); (2) full repayment (or prepayment); (3) delinquent for 
at least ninety days; (4) initiation of foreclosure; and (5) foreclosure completion. The 
probability of transitioning from any one state to another is modeled as a parametric 
survival function, except that full repayment and foreclosure completion are defined as 
terminal states from which the probability of exit was set to zero. Judgmentally, it is 




Loss Given Foreclosure (LGF) 
The LGF function in the FRB model is consistent with commonly employed 
representations of loss severity for residential mortgages, such as that underpinning the 
capital requirements of the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) for 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Within the FRB model, LGF = FE + INT – NR, where FE 
refers to foreclosure expenses (such as sales commissions, legal costs, taxes and 
maintenance costs); INT refers to lost interest income at the time of foreclosure; and NR 
is net recovery proceeds, which is typically negative and equals gross proceeds from 
foreclosure less the outstanding principal balance at the time of foreclosure completion.
16   
The FRB model assumes foreclosure expenses equal to 10 percent of the 
mortgage balance. Unpaid interest is calculated on the basis of interest rates generated 
                                                 
15 In Calem and LaCour-Little (previously referenced), a fixed, 10 percent probability of reinstatement was 
assumed. This assumption was subsequently refined in the version of the model underlying the present 
paper, in which the probability of reinstatement was allowed to depend on the current LTV ratio and was 
calibrated on the basis of information provided by Mortgage Insurance Companies of America (MICA). 
This distinction accounts for the differences between the economic capital estimates shown in table 2 and 
those reported in Calem and LaCour-Little. 
16 A reduction for mortgage insurance claims (MI) would normally be included as well, but it is omitted 
from our definition because only loans without MI are included in this analysis.    11 
 
during the simulation procedure.
17 Net recoveries are based on a regression equation 
relating historical net recovery to loan characteristics and housing market conditions, 
which was developed using an OFHEO database.
18 As is consistent with the findings of 
other researchers, the estimated net recovery equation implies that LGF is an increasing 
function of the current LTV ratio of the mortgage.
19   
 
Simulation Algorithm   
The model yields a probability distribution of cumulative foreclosure rates and 
cumulative credit loss rates for a pool of thirty-year, fixed-rate mortgages over a 
specified period. The simulation period was set at ten years for most exercises.
20 As 
already noted, a pool or segment is defined in terms of its initial risk characteristics: 
specifically, initial LTV ratio and FICO score, initial loan sizes, and remaining maturity. 
Given the behavioral equations and the LGF function, the probability distributions are 
estimated through a Monte Carlo procedure in which the basic risk drivers are simulated 
paths for house prices and interest rates.  
Rather than positing dynamic equations for interest rate and house price 
processes, as is often done in the literature, the FRB model's simulation algorithm draws 
15,000 simulated paths for house prices and interest rates from historical data. Each of 
the 15,000 simulations is termed a “trial.” Scenarios for these two variables are generated 
from the 76-quarter period 1982:Q1 through 2000:Q4. Each trial begins with a random 
selection of a quarter from the period 1982-91, a selection called the “starting quarter.” 
The simulated path of interest rates is then set to that reported in Freddie Mac’s quarterly 
interest rate survey over the ten-year span beginning with the starting quarter.  
The simulation of house price paths is more complex because it seeks to preserve 
regional correlation in the movements of house prices among metropolitan statistical 
areas (MSAs). Within a given trial, each loan in the portfolio is assigned randomly to one 
                                                 
17 A rate that measures the short-run cost of funds is used for both discounting and measuring lost interest.  
18 The exact specification and results are in table 3 of Calem and LaCour-Little (previously referenced).  
19 See, for example, Anthony Pennington-Cross, “Subprime and Prime Mortgages: Loss Distributions,” 
OFHEO Working Paper 03-01 (Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, 2003).  
20 The selected period is ten years or less. A smaller number is used if capital is higher than at the ten-year 
horizon. For this reason, periods shorter than ten years were used for riskier loans. Calem and LaCour-
Little (forthcoming) provide more detail on this point.    12 
 
of nine Census regions and then to an MSA selected to be consistent with the assumed 
degree of regional concentration, which is either “regionally concentrated” or “nationally 
diversified.” For expository purposes, the MSA to which the loan is assigned during the 
trial is termed the “designated MSA.”  The path for house price appreciation for a given 
trial and individual loan is set equal to that implied by the OFHEO house price index for 
the designated MSA for the period beginning with the starting quarter and ending ten 
years later.  
  The calculations are conducted using pools of 500 loans with a geographic 
distribution matching the distribution of either the nationally diversified or regionally 
concentrated portfolios. Given the draw of interest rate and house price paths for a trial 
and this interpretation, an expected cumulative rate of foreclosure completion and an 
expected cumulative discounted loss rate for the pool are computed using the empirical 
transition probabilities and loss-given-foreclosure relationship. Specifically, the expected 
cumulative default rate given a particular scenario is the sum of the predicted default 
rates for each of the 500 loans in the pool. The predicted default rates are simply the 
behavioral equations that define default evaluated at the particular scenario. Similarly, 
the expected cumulative loss rate given a particular scenario is the weighted-average loss 
rate for all 500 loans, where the weights are the predicted default rates for each loan. 
Upon replicating this procedure for all 15,000 trials, the full probability distributions of 
cumulative foreclosure rates and cumulative discounted losses are generated for the 
simulation horizon. Each point in the foreclosure or loss rate distribution corresponds to 
an expected cumulative foreclosure or, respectively, a loss rate given the draw of house 
prices and interest rates within the trial.  
Because the calculated loss distributions are derived from calculations of 
conditional expected values, they do not incorporate small-portfolio idiosyncratic risk 
and, hence, are applicable to a very large portfolio of loans. The use of a small pool of 
loans for the calculations is merely a technical convenience. Given the assumption that 
no single loan represents more than a negligible proportion of the overall portfolio 
containing the pool, the calculations as well as the interpretation of them as conditional 
expected values are appropriate.     13 
 
A variety of statistics from these distributions can be computed, but the critical 
ones for the purpose of estimating the implied asset-correlation parameter are the 
cumulative foreclosure rates and loss rates associated with a specified tail percentile. As 
discussed earlier, economic capital--or credit value-at-risk--equals the credit loss 
associated with the selected tail percentile of the simulated credit loss distribution less the 
expected loss. Under Basel II, a 99.9 percentile criterion is designated for calculating 
value-at-risk capital for a loan with one-year maturity. No criteria are specified for use 
with multiyear, cumulative loss distributions. A 99.9 percentile criterion corresponds 
roughly to the midpoint between A-minus and BBB-plus loss-coverage targets for a one-
year period (one-year insolvency probabilities for A-minus and BBB-plus bonds); hence, 
we use an analogous criterion to select the tail percentile for calculating credit value at 
risk for a multiyear period when applying the FRB model. Specifically, for instance, a 
98
th percentile criterion was applied in the case of a ten-year cumulative loss distribution, 
a choice corresponding to the midpoint between A-minus and BBB-plus ten-year 
cumulative loss-coverage targets.  
 
Implied Estimates of Economic Capital 
The FRB model generated the economic capital allocations associated with the 
selected loss-coverage target (between A-minus and BBB-plus) for various FICO scores 
and original LTV categories (table 2). We show results for two alternative specifications 
of the degree of geographic diversification. The nationally diversified portfolio, which 
represents the relevant benchmark for the Basel II rule, is calibrated in a way that 
distributes the loans broadly among all regions of the country (with 40 percent of the 
portfolio in the two regions with the largest concentration). For comparison, we also 
generate results for a regionally concentrated portfolio, in which loans are distributed 
equally among twelve MSAs within a single Census region. The loan-size distribution for 
each of these calculations was calibrated using Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data to 
reflect a typical large portfolio of conforming-size mortgages.
21 Also shown are 
                                                 
21 See Calem and LaCour-Little (forthcoming) for further details.     14 
 
annualized default (180-day delinquency) probabilities, which are employed below to 
reverse-engineer the implied asset correlations and estimates of recession LGD.
22 
The results (table 2, column 3) indicate that the economic capital levels for newly 
originated thirty-year fixed-rate mortgages in a nationally diversified portfolio range 
from less than 20 basis points (LTV ratio = 70 percent, FICO = 740) to 396 basis points 
(LTV ratio = 95 percent, FICO = 620). These results are consistent with widely held 
views about the nature of mortgage credit risk. Namely, portfolio credit risk increases 
with the initial LTV ratio and decreases with FICO.  
Another key finding pertains to the benefits of a nationally diversified portfolio. 
The benefits of national diversification in the FRB model are measured as the ratio of 
capital for a nationally diversified portfolio to that for a regionally concentrated portfolio 
(table 2, column 3 divided by column 2). The ratios range between 41 percent and 63 
percent, which suggests that the credit risk for nationally diversified portfolios is 
substantially less than that for a portfolio limited to a single Census region.  
We now summarize a number of comparisons conducted to benchmark the 
economic capital estimates produced by the FRB model. Each comparison has its own set 
of strengths and weaknesses. On balance, they suggest that the FRB model results are 
plausible and are likely to be within the range of estimates generated by other state-of-
the-art models.  
 
Study by Mortgage Insurance Companies of America 
In collaboration with Federal Reserve Board staff, members of the Mortgage 
Insurance Companies of America (MICA) carried out exercises to recalibrate the FRB 
model's behavioral equations using their internal data (table 3). The participating 
companies collectively account for 85 percent of the insured loans outstanding in the 
United States. This benchmark is thought to be particularly valuable in the estimation of 
                                                 
22 The PD and LGD estimates shown in the table are used in reverse-engineering the asset correlation from 
the economic capital figures. The method for determining PD is discussed in section IV, and the procedure 
for estimating LGD is described in the appendix.     15 
 
economic capital for residential mortgages with LTV ratios in excess of 80 percent, 
which is the general domain of mortgage insurance companies.
23 
Much effort was made to make the results of the MICA exercise as comparable as 
possible to those from the FRB model.
24 One difference that cannot be readily quantified 
concerns the definition of the terminal default state. The MICA study defines the terminal 
default state as a “claim event,” meaning a claim for reimbursement filed with the 
insurer. Although a claim event usually corresponds to a foreclosure completion, no solid 
estimates of the relationship between these two variables are available. The MICA study 
assumes that foreclosure completion and claim event are comparable, and it equates loss 
given a claim event to loss given foreclosure.   We suspect that losses associated with 
claim events may often be less than those associated with completed foreclosures because 
claim events include workouts or other events involving relatively minor losses.  This 
difference would tend to produce higher estimates of economic capital and higher 
estimates of the asset-correlation parameter.  The bias, however, could go the other way 
to the extent that foreclosures resulting in zero loss are not reported as claim events.  
Note that the MICA estimates (table 3) are higher than the FRB model estimates (table 2) 
for both the nationally diversified and regionally concentrated portfolios. The MICA 
estimates of economic capital are roughly 50 percent higher in each corresponding LTV 
and FICO category than the FRB estimates. The two sets of PD estimates are 
comparable, and the LGD estimates are identical by design (the MICA exercise 
employed the same LGF relationship as the FRB model). Hence, the MICA behavioral 
equations for default prediction appear to exhibit greater sensitivity to large house price 
                                                 
23 Nearly all of the loans in the databases have original LTV ratios of 85 percent or higher because lenders 
generally require PMI only for high-LTV-ratio loans. 
24 Because the PMI companies’ data do not indicate whether and when a loan becomes delinquent, but only 
the timing of prepayments and claim events, it was necessary to adapt the FRB model by eliminating the 
intermediate default state from the transition matrix. Thus, the model was amended to incorporate only 
three possible transitions given a loan surviving to a given quarter: a claim event; prepayment; or continued 
survival. To calibrate the conditional transition probabilities, each participating company independently 
estimated piecewise exponential survival equations for a claim event and prepayment. For consistency with 
the original FRB analysis, attention was restricted to fixed-rate, conforming-size loans. After completing 
the calibration process, each of the participating companies independently ran the simulation procedure. 
The numbers in the table reflect the average values, although results based upon the median values are very 
similar.     16 
 
declines than the FRB credit model, and, as is discussed below, the MICA results also 
imply higher asset correlations. 
 
Large Financial Institution (LFI) 
A second benchmark consisted of results from the portfolio credit risk model of a 
large financial institution (LFI) that wishes to remain anonymous. This model combines 
empirical transition models of mortgage default and prepayment with simulation of risk-
factor scenarios based on dynamic equations for interest rate and house price processes. 
By making certain adjustments, we converted the ten-year, nondiscounted, expected-loss 
estimates and selected tail-loss estimates provided by the institution into economic 
capital estimates comparable to those obtained from the calculations using the FRB and 
MICA models.
25  As can be seen by comparing columns 2 and 3 of table 4, the LFI model 
generally produces estimates of required economic capital that are on the order of 50 
percent higher than the FRB model (column 2).
26  
  
Model Developed by Fitch Ratings, Inc.  
The last benchmarking exercise is based on a model developed by Fitch Ratings, 
Inc., for use in rating residential-mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs). The credit 
enhancement or loss coverage needed for a given RMBS to qualify for a given rating 
grade is determined by this model as a function of the characteristics of the underlying 
pool of securitized mortgages.
27   Although the model does not define an expected-loss 
scenario, we interpret the loss coverage associated with a B-rating as representing a 
reasonable approximation to expected loss.  Higher ratings correspond to loss-coverage 
                                                 
25 The 98
th percentile loss rate was obtained by extrapolation and then multiplied by an appropriate 
fractional quantity to convert nondiscounted into discounted value-at-risk measures. The fractional 
multiplier was computed using the FRB model with and without discounting and taking the ratio of the 
results, and generally was equal to 0.60.  In the case of subprime loans (low FICO scores) with high LTV 
ratios, the multiplier was 0.67, reflecting faster accumulation of losses 
26 Although not shown in the table, the LFI model results also support a much larger benefit to national 
diversification than the FRB model. Whereas the FRB model suggests multiples of 1.5 to 2.5, the LFI 
model suggests multiples in excess of 3. 
27 These results were derived from Fitch Ratings, Inc., (Fitch) RMBS Model version 4.0. Fitch is currently 
using version 5.2, which is based on new empirical data. A comparison of the output from the two versions 
is under way. The preliminary results appear, on average, to be broadly consistent; however, the    17 
 
thresholds sufficient for conditions of economic stress, in which the higher the rating, the 
more extreme the associated stress scenario. For a pool of newly originated, thirty-year, 
fixed-rate mortgages having a specified LTV ratio and FICO score, economic capital is 
calculated as the difference between the loss coverage required for a BBB-plus rating and 
the loss coverage for a B rating, multiplied by an appropriate discount factor (table 4, 
column 4).
28  
The Fitch model and the FRB model produce broadly comparable estimates of 
economic capital. However, significant differences emerge within specific bands of FICO 
scores. Economic capital estimates are higher in the 600 FICO score categories using the 
Fitch model than those implied by the FRB model, but they are lower in the 720 FICO 
categories.  
 
IV. Solving for the Asset-Correlation Parameter  
Here we summarize how the economic capital results described above have been 
translated into an estimate of the appropriate asset-correlation parameter, ρ, for 
residential mortgages. The translation is accomplished by solving for the value of ρ that 
equates the model-generated amount of economic capital to the amount of regulatory 
capital generated by the Basel II rule for the same PDs and LGDs.  
Reverse-engineering of the implied asset correlations from economic capital 
allocations is accomplished in three steps. First, an annualized PD is derived from the 
cumulative foreclosure completion rate generated by the model from which the economic 
capital allocations were obtained. The annual probability of foreclosure completion is 
defined as the geometric average of the ten-year cumulative foreclosure completion rate. 
This result is then transformed to be consistent with the proposed definition of default 
that would apply to U.S. banks under Basel II, which is 180-days delinquent (or less if 
foreclosure is completed in less than 180 days).
29  Specifically, PD is set equal to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
completion of this comparison may show some differences in the required enhancement (economic capital 
estimates) levels generated by the two models for certain combinations of LTV ratios and FICO scores. 
28 Again, a fractional multiplier of 60 percent (or 67 percent in the case of subprime) is applied to serve as 
a discount factor to convert undiscounted cumulative losses--the focus of the Fitch approach--to a present-
value number. 
29 This is the definition provided in “Risk-Based Capital Guidelines: Implementation of New Basel Capital 
Accord,” August 4, 2003, at www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2003/20030804/default.htm.    18 
 
probability of foreclosure divided by 0.75, which implies that 25 percent of the loans that 
are 180-days delinquent ultimately “cure.”
30   
Next, a “historically based” recession LGF is calculated on the basis of evaluation 
of the FRB’s LGF function for particular interest rate and house price scenarios. The 
chosen scenarios represent actual, “historical” interest rate and house price outcomes, as 
described in the appendix. These are then translated into recession LGDs by multiplying 
the calculated LGF by 0.75, which is based on the previously noted assumption of a 25 
percent cure rate from 180-day delinquency.  
In the final step of the process, we compute the asset-correlation parameter that 
best matches the results of the economic capital model to the output of the Basel II rule 
for regulatory capital, equation (1).  Since the Basel II rule incorporates the one-year 
expected loss rate (PD times LGD) in its definition of capital, the FRB economic capital 
results are combined with estimates of the one-year expected loss rate. For any given PD 
and LGD, this combined quantity is substituted for  k on the left side of (1), and then the 
value of the asset correlation that solves this equation is calculated.  
No single value of the asset-correlation parameter will produce absolute equality 
between the capital model and the Basel II rule across the range of mortgage types 
considered above, as characterized by different LTV ratios and FICO scores. Rather,  
                                                                                                                                                 
The document is the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) and contains the proposed 
application of the Basel II accord for the United States and seeks feedback on a number of issues. 
According to the ANPR, “All residential mortgages ... would be charged off, or charged down to the value 
of the property, after a maximum of 180 days past due… In addition, the Agencies are proposing to define 
a retail default to include the occurrence of any one of the three following events if it occurs prior to the 
respective 120- or 180-day FFIEC policy trigger: (1) a full or partial charge-off resulting from a significant 
decline in the credit quality of the exposure; (2) a distressed restructuring or workout involving forbearance 
and loan modification; or (3) a notification that the obligor has sought or been placed in bankruptcy” (p. 
40). Reflecting data limitations, the equations used below and in many empirical studies of mortgage 
behavior use definitions of default that differ from the Basel II definition. Default in these studies is usually 
defined as foreclosure initiation, a foreclosure alternative or workout, a mortgage insurance claim event, 
real estate owned (REO), etc. Ultimately, it is necessary to convert the default probabilities and loss 
severities implied by these models into PD and LGD inputs on the basis of the ANPR definition of default. 
The FRB model's methodology for making this conversion is described in the text.
  
30 A cure rate of 25 percent is based on Larry Cordell and Jericho Trianna, “Who Pays, Who Stays, and 
Who Strays,” Secondary Mortgage Market, Freddie Mac, December 1999, pp. 8-14.     19 
 
application of this procedure in the case of the FRB credit model generates a range of 
estimates of the asset-correlation parameter that vary by risk segment (figure 1).  The 
estimates of the asset-correlation parameter center around 15 percent for the particular 
risk segments considered. The highest estimate is 16.1 percent and the lowest is 12.2 
percent. The lowest values are generally associated with LTV ratios of 70 percent.  A 
nonlinear and humpbacked relationship is apparent, although the differences seem likely 
to fall within the range of uncertainties associated with our statistical and modeling 
procedures.  
The relationship between the FRB results and the value of the asset-correlation 
parameters implied by the benchmarks is also consistent with the discussion of economic 
capital in the previous section. Namely, the MICA results imply higher asset 
correlations--consistently above 20 percent. They also suggest a modest decline with 
respect to PD. The results based on the Fitch model are, like the economic capital results, 
generally consistent with the FRB results. However, they do display a modest positive 
relationship between PD and the asset-correlation parameter. They are also higher than 
the FRB results for the loans with LTV ratios of 70 percent.  
An independent analysis conducted by the Capital Working Group of the Risk 
Management Association (RMA) provides a different perspective on the size of the asset-
correlation parameter.
31 Its recommendations reflect the results of a survey of practices 
among members of the group. The group recommends an asset-correlation parameter in 
the range of 6 percent to 10 percent.
32 Furthermore, a positive relationship between PD 
and the asset-correlation parameter is suggested by its analysis. We have not fully 
analyzed the reasons for the differences between the RMA results and those of other 
models.  
 
                                                 
31 See “Retail Credit Economic Capital Estimation – Best Practices,” The Risk Management Association, 
February 2003, at www.rmahq.org/Basel2/RMA_Retail_Credit_Risk_24feb03_FINAL.pdf. 
32 The RMA report also note that their views are also consistent with an independent research project 
conducted by David Kaskowitz, Alexander Kipkalov, Kyle Lundstedt, and John Mingo, “Best Practices in 
Mortgage Default Risk Measurement and Economic Capital,” February 1, 2002, at 
www.loanperformance.com.    20 
 
Summary 
The evidence presented above suggests that an asset correlation with a fixed value 
of 15 percent is reasonably consistent with the available evidence for U.S. residential 
mortgages. This value is consistent with the FRB credit model and firmly within the 
range available from other evidence. This conclusion pertains to the characteristics  of the 
products analyzed by the FRB model--high quality, conventional, first lien, newly 
originated with thirty-year maturities, fixed interest rates, and loan sizes within the 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac size limits. The results based on the Fitch model represent 
an additional body of evidence broadly consistent with a value of 15 percent for these 
types of mortgage products.  
As with all empirical research, our analysis has limitations relating to data, 
statistical procedures, and inclusiveness. For instance, adjustable-rate mortgages and 
home-equity loans are not examined, and subprime mortgages and mortgages with high 
expected losses are considered only to the extent that they correspond to borrowers with 
low FICO scores. Also, the analysis adopted certain technical assumptions in developing 
the PD and LGD inputs.  For example, PD in the FRB model is derived from the long-run 
cumulative default rates assuming a constant maturity.  In practice, banks may use other 
methods of obtaining annualized default rates.    21   
 
Table 1: Proposed Basel II Capital for Single-Family Residential Mortgages* 
 
Selected examples of simulated PD, LGD, and Basel II capital by risk segments 
 
 






















70 / 620  0.27         16              9   34 
70 / 660  0.16         16              6   23 
70 / 700  0.10         16              4   16 
70 / 740  0.07         16              3   12 
80 / 620  0.51         25           21  85 
80 / 660  0.31         25           15   59 
80 / 700  0.20         25            11   42 
80 / 740  0.15         25              8   34 
90 / 620  1.00         33            46   182 
90 / 660  0.62         33            33   131 
90 / 700  0.42         34           25   100 
90 / 740  0.30         34           19   77 
95 / 620  1.38         36            62   248 
95 / 660  0.87         37            46   183 
95 / 700  0.58         37            35   138 
95 / 740  0.43         37            28   111 
Jumbo Prime 
Pool  0.27         25            13   53 




Prime Loans  0.19         25            10   40 
 
Source: Calculation by FRB staff. 
*Corrected version of the table presented in the October 15, 2003, version of this paper, which erroneously 
showed average values for LGD in column 2; the correction also affects columns 3 and 4.  In the text, these 
changes required the correction of one number on p.5 (the risk weight for the 95/620 LTV/FICO score) and 
one number on p. 6 (the capital requirement for that score); none of the changes has had a material affect 
on the paper.    22 
 
 
Table 2: Economic Capital Estimates from the FRB Credit Model 
 
Simulated PD, LGD, and economic capital by LTV and credit  































70 / 620  0.27 16.0  0.58  1.03 
70 / 660  0.16 16.0  0.37  0.62 
70 / 700  0.10 16.0  0.25  0.41 
70 / 740  0.07 16.0  0.19  0.30 
80 / 620  0.51 25.0  1.57  2.98 
80 / 660  0.31 25.0  1.09  1.98 
80 / 700  0.20 25.0  0.79  1.38 
80 / 740  0.15 25.0  0.61  1.03 
90 / 620  1.00 33.0  3.08  6.94 
90 / 660  0.62 33.0  2.37  4.92 
90 / 700  0.42 34.0  1.90  3.64 
90 / 740  0.30 34.0  1.55  2.80 
95 / 620  1.38 36.0  3.96  9.56 
95 / 660  0.87 37.0  3.20  7.10 
95 / 700  0.58 37.0  2.64  5.42 
95 / 740  0.43 37.0  2.23  4.25 
 
Source: Calculations by FRB staff.    23 
 
  Table 3: Economic Capital Estimates from the MICA Study 
 
Simulated PD, LGD, and economic capital by LTV and credit score  
































90 / 620  0.91 33.0  4.57  9.16 
90 / 660  0.60 33.0  3.69  6.78 
90 / 700  0.39 34.0  3.03  4.97 
90 / 740  0.26 34.0  2.37  3.54 
95 / 620  1.35 36.0  6.11  12.98 
95 / 660  0.90 37.0  4.95  10.19 
95 / 700  0.61 37.0  4.10  7.71 




Source: Results produced by a joint effort of MICA and the FRB staff.   24 
 
Table 4: Economic Capital Estimates for Nationally Diversified Portfolios 
 
FRB vs. Large Financial Institution vs. Fitch  


















70 / 600  0.66  NA  1.00 
70 / 660  0.37  NA  0.44 
70 / 720  0.20  0.37  0.21 
80 / 600   1.78  NA  2.51 
80 / 660   1.09  1.68  1.08 
80 / 720  0.68  1.00  0.49 
90 / 600  3.44  NA  4.75 
90 / 660  2.37  NA  2.47 
90 / 720  1.72  NA  1.04 
95 / 600  4.39  NA  6.13 
95 / 660  3.20  NA  3.41 
95 / 720  2.41  NA  1.48 
 
Source: Calculations by FRB staff, an anonymous financial institution, and Fitch Ratings, 
Inc. The Fitch results were derived from Fitch Ratings, Inc. (Fitch) RMBS Model version 
4.0. Currently, Fitch is utilizing version 5.2, which is based on new empirical data. A 
comparison of the modeled output between the two versions is still being completed. The 
preliminary results appear, on average, to be broadly consistent; however, the completion 
of this comparison may show some differences in the required enhancement (economic 
capital estimates) levels generated by the two models at certain LTV / FICO scores. 
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Source: Calculations by FRB staff based upon input from MICA and Fitch.    26 
 
Appendix: Calculation of the Recession LGD 
The recession LGD measures in table 2, column 1, correspond to what a 
regionally diversified institution might calculate as average and stress-period loss 
severities from historically observed outcomes. These measures are calculated using the 
state-transition relationships in the FRB model to simulate the performance of historical 
vintages for an illustrative, geographically diversified portfolio. This is accomplished by 
suppressing the procedure for randomly generating risk-factor scenarios in the model. 
That is, loans are assigned regional locations that are held fixed (locations are not 
reassigned across runs as in the full simulation procedure) while default and loss-rate 
calculations are conducted for historical vintages defined by origination quarter for 
origination quarters in 1986 through 1993. 
The fourth year after origination is selected to represent the average age of loans 
that default, and loss-severity measures for loans of this age are then calculated. Expected 
foreclosure and loss rates in the fourth year subsequent to origination are calculated for 
each vintage conditional on the historical paths for house prices and interest rates since 
the origination quarter. The conditional expected loss given foreclosure for each quarterly 
vintage is then calculated as the conditional expected loss in the fourth year divided by 
the conditional expected default rate in the fourth year. This value is then multiplied by 
0.75 for conversion into a conditional expected LGD, which is averaged over all 
quarterly vintages to obtain the “historical average LGD.”  The maximum value over all 
quarterly vintages of conditional expected LGD is the historically based recession LGD.  
The results shown in table 2 indicate that historical stress-period LGDs range 
from 16 percent to 37 percent for mortgages with an LTV ratio of 70 percent or higher 
and no PMI. These results, it should be emphasized, depend on the historical house price 
dynamics in the particular regions to which the loans have been assigned during the 
period considered, as well as on interest rate levels (which determine the interest carrying 
charge for a nonpaying mortgage). In particular, the largest loan concentrations (about 50 
percent of the regionally diversified portfolio) for these illustrative calculations were 
assigned to the U.S. Census Bureau’s Far West, New England, and Mid-Atlantic 
divisions, which are areas that experienced housing market weaknesses over much the 
period from 1988 through 1995. 